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FINGERPRINT NOT RECOGNIZED: WHY THE UNITED STATES 
NEEDS TO PROTECT BIOMETRIC PRIVACY 
Blake Benson* 
Rising interest in biometrics—the modern umbrella term for 
physical and behavioral characteristics possessed by humans and 
used to identify one another—has motivated large technology 
companies to produce products that allow consumers to access vital 
information using only their unique biometric identifiers. Because 
biometric information is unique to each person on the planet, it is a 
valuable way to secure personal data. However, the uniqueness and 
permanence of biometric information heighten the consequences of 
security breaches when compared to the compromise of simple 
alphanumeric passwords. Growing interest in biometric technology 
across the United States has motivated a small number of state 
legislatures to address the collection, storage, and distribution of 
biometric information by business entities, but the legal framework 
for handling that information is largely underdeveloped. As 
biometric identification becomes more prevalent, the rest of the 
states and the federal government must decide how to address 
privacy concerns. Passing new laws, retrofitting old laws to address 
new technologies, and choosing not to take legislative action are 
just a few of the options both state and federal governments are 
considering. Based on the level of interest, and the number of 
concerns, with biometric identification technology, the federal 
government is best equipped to address these concerns. If Congress 
chooses to introduce biometric privacy legislation, which would 
provide uniform protection for all American consumers and 
employees, there will certainly be relentless lobbying from the tech 
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2019. The author 
would like to thank the staff and editors of the UNC Journal of Law & Technology 
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sector concerning the contents of the bill. Congress will need to 
balance biometric privacy with corporate interests if they decide to 
try and enact a much-needed biometric privacy law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Humans have been using physical and behavioral traits, or 
biometrics, to identify one another for thousands of years.1 
Biometrics are officially defined as “measurable physical and 
behavioral characteristics that enable the establishment and 
verification of an individual’s identity” by the Biometric Research 
Group.2 Ancient Egyptians used physical characteristics to 
differentiate between trustworthy and untrustworthy traders, while 
the Babylonians verified business transactions by stamping 
fingerprints into clay tablets as early as the sixth century.3 By the 
nineteenth century, societies used physical characteristics, such as 
height, arm length, and fingerprints, to document convicted 
criminals and identify suspects in ongoing criminal investigations.4 
Modern technology has made cataloging and using physical 
characteristics for various purposes far easier and more expansive.5 
Today, using biometrics to identify someone is just another part of 
daily life.6 For example, modern smartphones offer users the option 
of unlocking their device with a fingerprint before they log in to their 
Facebook application and use its facial recognition function to tag 
friends in photos.7 Technology has made physical biometric 
identification a valuable, and readily available, tool for countless 
people across the globe.8 
Commercial use of biometric technology has become 
particularly divisive in the United States. A 2017 study conducted 
by Viewpost, an American corporation offering online payment 
                                                 
 1 See Stephen Mayhew, History of Biometrics, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Jan. 14, 
2015), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201501/history-of-biometrics. 
 2 Rawlson King, What Are Biometrics?, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Jan. 24, 2016), 
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201601/what-are-biometrics-2. 
 3 Silvio Barra et al., Unconstrained Ear Processing: What Is Possible and What 
Must Be Done, in SIGNAL AND IMAGE PROCESSING FOR BIOMETRICS 130 (Jason 
Scharcanski et al. eds., 2014); Mayhew, supra note 1. 
 4 Mayhew, supra note 1. 
 5 See generally April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along with Serious 
Security Concerns, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com
/2016/03/biometrics-coming-along-serious-security-concerns/. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. 
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services, found that 80% of the 1,000 Americans surveyed are “in 
support of biometrics-enabled payments technologies and 
currencies” and that 50% “believe fingerprint technology will be 
used for authentication to pay and receive payments over the next 
10 years.”9 A conflicting study prepared by the Consumer 
Technology Association (CTA) in March of 2016 reported that 28% 
of American adults are “less than comfortable” and another 42% 
“have neutral sentiments” about the usage of biometric technology 
for commercial purposes.10 Yet another survey, conducted by the 
information technology corporation Unisys, determined that 33% of 
the 11,244 Americans surveyed actually thought biometric 
identifiers were “effective security feature[s].”11 Conflicting survey 
results seem to indicate that commercial use of biometric technology 
has divided Americans into two categories: those that are willing to 
sacrifice their right to privacy for efficient, accurate biometric 
identification features and those that are not. Of course, it is possible 
that the survey results referenced may be skewed by questions that 
emphasize either privacy or innovation. Biometric identification 
features offer improved convenience and accuracy to consumers, 
but a large number of Americans are not willing to sacrifice the 
privacy of their unique identifiers for the ability to log into their 
bank account with a fingerprint instead of an alphanumeric 
password.12 
Biometric technology offers Americans a vast array of benefits, 
but they come at a cost.13 Biometric information is both “inherently 
public,” meaning that other people can easily view and gain access 
                                                 
 9 Justin Lee, Study Finds Americans Support Biometrics-based Payment 
Systems, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (July 18, 2017), http://www.biometricupdate.com
/201707/study-finds-americans-support-biometrics-based-payment-systems. 
 10 Recent Opinion Surveys on Public Perceptions of Biometrics, INT’L 
BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY ASS’N, https://www.ibia.org/download/datasets/3372
/Public-Perceptions-of-Biometrics-opinion-surveys%20.pdf. 
 11 Justin Lee, Unisys Survey Finds One-third of Americans View Biometrics on 
Smartphones as Effective, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201507/unisys-survey-finds-one-third-of-
americans-view-biometrics-on-smartphones-as-effective. 
 12 See Glaser, supra note 5. 
 13 See id. (telling readers that biometrics are beneficial to Americans but that 
they also have many drawbacks that must be properly mitigated). 
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to it, and “inherently private” because every American possesses 
unique biometric identifiers.14 Unlike a password, which is designed 
to be kept secret and can be changed in seconds, biometric 
information is permanent, making it extremely sensitive material.15 
Just one example of this privacy concern is how often American’s 
leave fingerprints on different surfaces.16 The inherently public 
nature of biometrics leads to another pressing issue: the collection 
and usage of biometric information by businesses, law enforcement 
officials, and other third parties.17 Facebook’s opt-in facial 
recognition feature is one example of a third-party using the 
inherently public nature of biometrics for a proprietary purpose.18 
Third-party usage of biometrics does not stop at physical 
characteristics either: Israeli firm BioCatch is developing a 
technology to track computer usage behavior for detection of 
fraudulent banking and shopping activity.19 Biometric technology 
can make daily activities, like logging into a phone, easier and more 
secure, but there are obvious concerns that must be addressed 
because biometric identifiers can be classified as both public and 
private information.20 
Although state governments have taken notice of the rising 
number of corporations investing in biometric technology, few 
states have actually taken action to mitigate the negative impacts of 
                                                 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Chiara A. Sottile, As Biometric Scanning Use Grows, So Does Security 
Risk, NBC (July 24, 2016, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/mach
/biometric-scanning-use-grows-so-do-security-risks-ncna593161 (explaining that 
biometric data breaches are extremely severe because identifiers are unique to 
each individual and cannot be changed if the information is stolen or 
disseminated). 
 16 See Glaser, supra note 5 (explaining that finger prints are left on everyday 
objects, like glassware, and businesses interested in acquiring those prints can do 
so with relative ease if they so choose). 
 17 See id. (establishing that other government entities, like the IRS, hospitals, 
and banks, are third parties that use biometric identification technology). 
 18 Stuart Dredge, 10 Things You Need to Know About Biometrics Technology, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014
/sep/17/10-things-to-know-about-biometrics. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Glaser, supra note 5. 
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the technology on individual privacy.21 Illinois, Washington, and 
Texas are currently the only states that have enacted commercial 
biometric privacy laws.22 As of the publication date of this Recent 
Development, no federal efforts to pass a commercial biometric 
privacy law have been reported. Other states have biometric privacy 
laws pending, and Montana is all but certain to pass its own 
biometric privacy law this year.23 The existing laws in Illinois, 
Washington, and Texas impose civil penalties for violations, but 
only the Illinois law offers citizens a private right of action.24 
Washington and Texas’s commercial biometric privacy laws leave 
enforcement up to the state’s attorney general.25 As more states 
decide whether to protect their citizens’ biometric privacy, the 
question of whether the federal government should step in and pass 
a law regulating the collection of biometrics on a national scale 
becomes increasingly relevant. 
This Recent Development advocates for a much-needed federal 
law that protects consumers and employees from identity theft 
stemming from the improper or negligent commercial usage of 
biometric information. It is important for this law to include a 
private right of action so citizens themselves can hold commercial 
entities responsible for potential misuses of biometric information. 
A federal law offering citizens a private right of action will have 
drawbacks, including staunch opposition from tech companies and 
numerous courtroom battles over statutory interpretation. Most new 
laws require some level of interpretation,26 but a biometric privacy 
law would be particularly troublesome because there is no 
                                                 
 21 Karla Grossenbacher & Christopher W. Kelleher, Hazards Ahead: Uptick in 
Biometric Privacy Laws Can Put Employers in Hot Seat, EMP. L. LOOKOUT (Oct. 
3, 2017), https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/10/hazards-
ahead-uptick-in-biometric-privacy-laws-can-put-employers-in-hot-seat/. 
 22 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008); 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 503.001 (West 2009); H.B. 1493, 65th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). 
 23 See Grossenbacher & Kelleher, supra note 21. 
 24 See COMP. STAT. 14/10; BUS. & COM. § 503.001; H.B. 1493 (Wash. 2017). 
 25 See BUS. & COM. § 503.001; H.B. 1493 (Wash. 2017). 
 26 See generally LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2014) 
(establishing that American courts frequently need to interpret statutes when 
applying them to specific cases). 
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universally accepted set of definitions for biometric identifiers. 
Even a thorough definitions section will not be able to predict every 
application of biometric technology in the future.27 
Current and future uses for biometric technology, as well as the 
policy behind why these uses demand a high-level of privacy 
protection, appear in Part II of this Recent Development. Part III 
discusses the current landscape of state biometric privacy 
regulations in more detail and explains why existing laws do not 
provide adequate protection for biometric privacy. Part IV makes 
recommendations on what a federal biometrics law could, and 
should, look like. Finally, Part V evaluates the arguments for and 
against enacting a federal biometric privacy law before concluding 
that a federal law is necessary. 
II. WHY BIOMETRIC PRIVACY MATTERS 
As more companies develop products that utilize biometric 
technology, privacy continues to become an increasingly important 
consideration.28 Technology companies began releasing biometric 
security devices for computers in the 1990s, but early versions did 
not attract customers because they were “clunky” and 
“inconvenient.”29 Motorola released the first smartphone with a 
fingerprint scanner in 2011, but Apple’s addition of scanners to the 
iPhone in 2013 ignited mainstream interest in commercial biometric 
technology.30 Some privacy experts have argued, and continue to 
                                                 
 27 See Lara Tumeh, Washington’s New Biometric Privacy Statute and How It 
Compares to Illinois and Texas Law, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/washington-s-new-biometric-privacy-
70894/ (showing that even states with existing biometric privacy laws use 
different definitions for “biometric identifier”). 
 28 See generally Glaser, supra note 5 (discussing the growing usage of 
biometric technology in the United States and identifying the serious harm that 
could result from the misuse of biometric information). 
 29 See Jack M. Germain, IBM Introducing Fingerprint Reader into Laptop, 
TECH NEWS WORLD (Oct. 4, 2004, 4:44 AM), https://www.technewsworld.com
/story/37017.html (reporting that IBM introduced one of the first built-in 
fingerprint scanners for computers and establishing that early biometric security 
technology was not practical or popular). 
 30 See Glaser, supra note 5 (highlighting other types of biometric technology in 
development including, but not limited to, heartbeat identification, speech pattern 
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argue, that the inherent privacy of biometric information makes it 
safer than alternatives like a PIN number or a user-generated 
password.31 After all, these proponents assert, individual physical 
characteristics, like fingerprints, appear to be unique and incapable 
of duplication.32 
However, Georgetown Law professor Alvaro Bedoya, the 
executive director of the school’s Center on Privacy & Technology, 
argues that biometric information is not as “inherently private” as 
proponents want to think, and to the contrary, is actually inherently 
public.33 He points out that even though each American has unique 
biometric information, accessing that information is as easy as 
taking a picture of someone’s facial features or taking fingerprints 
off of a glass after having a drink.34 While it is easy to notice another 
person’s biometric identifiers, like fingerprints, those identifiers are 
still extremely private information unique to each individual. 
Biometric identifiers, like fingerprints and facial structure, are what 
makes each human being unique and deeming that information to be 
solely public conveys to the world that biometric information should 
be treated as a public resource. Classifying biometric identifiers as 
solely public information jeopardizes the biometric privacy of every 
American and this classification should be rejected in favor of one 
that emphasizes the private and public characteristics of biometric 
information. 
Bedoya’s assertion that biometric identifiers are “inherently 
public” is difficult to reconcile with the idea that those same 
identifiers should be treated as highly sensitive information, but his 
concerns about the misuse of biometrics are far from hypothetical. 
                                                 
identification, and even vascular eye pattern identification); Casey Newton, 
Apple’s New iPhone Will Read Your Fingerprint, VERGE (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:57 
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/10/4715372/confirmed-apple-iphone-
5s-will-include-touch-id-fingerprint-scanner. 
 31 See Glaser, supra note 5 (explaining that even though biometric technology 
is safer than traditional alphanumeric passwords in that it uses characteristics 
unique to each American, that same uniqueness makes biometrics more harmful 
if compromised due to one’s ability to document another’s biometric 
information). 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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Bedoya’s concerns were confirmed when Jason Chaikin, the 
president of a corporation that produces finger scanning technology, 
used Play-Doh to preserve a tester’s fingerprints and unlock an 
iPhone at a demonstration.35 Chaikin also managed to use the same 
process to unlock a Samsung Galaxy and an LG Nexus in a matter 
of minutes.36 Nathaniel Couper-Noles of Neohapsis, a security firm 
owned by Cisco, has even handled situations where fingerprints 
were stolen by taking high-quality photographs without any physical 
replication.37 Biometric information may be unique to each 
individual, but that does not make it completely secure. 
The inherent and permanent uniqueness of biometric 
information makes it more harmful if compromised than traditional 
security mechanisms, such as a simple alphanumeric password.38 
Passwords and credit cards “can be easily replaced,” but “it is very 
difficult . . . for any individual to disassociate oneself from one’s 
biometric [information].”39 Biometric information linked to an 
individual in a database is exceedingly difficult to replace or change 
because it is unique to that person.40 That being said, a rare set of 
exceptional circumstances can change an individual’s biometric 
identifiers.41 More alarming, catalogs of biometric information 
stored on a computer database can be easily compromised in the 
same way as any other computer system.42 Acquiring someone’s 
biometric information could be as simple as acquiring an 
                                                 
 35 Jeff John Roberts, This Guy Unlocked My iPhone with Play-Doh, FORTUNE 
(Apr. 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/07/guy-unlocked-iphone-play-doh/. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Glaser, supra note 5 (explaining that traditional identification methods 
can easily be changed and replaced, whereas biometrics stay unique to a single 
person forever). 
 39 Rigoberto Chinchilla, Ethical and Social Consequences of Biometric 
Technologies, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENGINEERING EDUC. 1, 5–6 (2012), 
https://www.asee.org/public/conferences/8/papers/3789/view. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Kaveh Waddell, When Fingerprints Are as Easy to Steal as Passwords, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive
/2017/03/new-biometrics/520695/ (explaining that bodily changes, such as blood 
vessel alteration, stemming from pregnancy can confuse biometric identification 
technology). 
 42 Chinchilla, supra note 39, at 5–6. 
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alphanumeric password once databases are created.43 The same 
unique characteristics that make biometric identification technology 
so appealing also make mitigating compromised data considerably 
more difficult than resetting a stolen password.44 
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF AMERICAN BIOMETRIC 
PRIVACY LAW 
A select number of state legislatures have introduced or passed 
biometric privacy laws in response to the rising number of 
commercial products that offer biometric recognition.45 Illinois 
passed the Biometric Information Privacy Act in 2008, making it the 
first state with a commercial biometric privacy law.46 Texas 
followed Illinois’s lead and became the second state to enact a 
biometric privacy law in 2009,47 while Washington became the third 
state when it passed H.B. 1493 in May 2017.48 No other states have 
joined Illinois, Texas, and Washington, but biometric privacy laws 
are pending in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.49 At the time of 
publication, Congress has not taken public steps towards a 
nationwide biometric privacy law. 
Although state governments are just beginning to regulate 
commercial collection of biometric information, they have been 
restricting biometric collection by schools and government actors 
for years.50 Existing and pending state biometric privacy laws tend 
to fall into three categories: laws that restrict the collection of 
                                                 
 43 Id. 
 44 Glaser, supra note 5. 
 45 See generally Ted Claypoole & Cameron Stoll, Developing Laws Address 
Flourishing Commercial Use of Biometric Information, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/08_claypoole.html 
(recognizing that the popularity and privacy concerns associated with biometric 
technology have caused states to regulate collection of biometrics). 
 46 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008). 
 47 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2009). 
 48 H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); Washington Becomes Third 
State to Enact Biometric Privacy Law, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO. 
SEC. BLOG (June 1, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/06/01
/washington-becomes-third-state-enact-biometric-privacy-law/. 
 49 Grossenbacher & Kelleher, supra note 21. 
 50 Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 45. 
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biometrics belonging to students, laws that restrict the collection of 
biometric information by government entities, and laws that restrict 
the collection of biometric information by businesses.51 Despite its 
commercial nature, the healthcare industry is exempted by state 
biometrics laws because medical privacy is protected by the federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).52 
Many states, including North Carolina and West Virginia, already 
protect the biometric information of students at K-12 schools.53 
These states restrict the collection of student biometric information 
by only allowing disclosure with parental consent and requiring the 
information to be destroyed once the owner of the biometric data 
graduates or switches schools.54 Maine and New Hampshire restrict 
the collection of biometric data related to personal identification, 
like driver’s licenses, but they allow biometric data collection for 
law enforcement or immigration purposes.55 Even though many 
states protect citizens against specific instances of biometric 
collection, only Illinois, Washington, and Texas have laws that 
prevent the collection of biometrics for general commercial use.56 
A. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act 
Illinois became the first state to regulate the commercial 
gathering of biometric information by enacting the Biometric 
Information Privacy Act (BIPA) in 2008.57 “Biometric information,” 
as broadly defined by the Act, means “any information, regardless 
of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an 
individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual;” it 
further defines “biometric identifier” as “a retina or iris scan, 
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”58 BIPA 
                                                 
 51 Id. 
 52 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008). 
 53 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C‑402.5 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-5h (2012). 
 54 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C‑402.5; W. VA. CODE § 18-2-5h; see also Claypoole 
& Stoll, supra note 45. 
 55 ME. STAT. tit. 29, § 1401 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260:10-b (2014). 
 56 COMP. STAT. 14/10; 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 
2009); H.B. 1493, 65 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); 2017 Wash. Sess. Laws 
1141. 
 57 COMP. STAT. 14/10. 
 58 Id. 
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prohibits selling, trading, leasing or otherwise profiting from 
collected biometric data and mandates transparency in the 
collection, use, and storage of that data.59 In addition, the Act 
requires corporations to obtain written consent from employees and 
customers when acquiring, using, or storing biometric information 
from these individuals.60 The Act provides consumers and 
employees a private right of action for violations.61 Photographs, 
digital signatures, writing samples, and biological samples are 
excluded from coverage under BIPA.62 
Since its passage, BIPA has been a lightning rod for legal 
action.63 Between July 2017 and publication, twenty-six class-action 
lawsuits have been filed against Illinois employers under BIPA.64 
Most of the employee-filed lawsuits assert that employers, including 
Speedway and InterContinental Hotels Group, are collecting and 
storing fingerprint data without consent.65 The plaintiffs in those 
suits are accusing the employers of collecting the fingerprints from 
machines that use biometric data to clock in employees for their 
shifts.66 By not obtaining consent or notifying employees of how 
their biometric information is being collected and stored, employers 
violate BIPA. 
The flood of BIPA lawsuits is not limited to employees suing 
employers; consumers are also turning to BIPA to protect their 
biometric information in both state and federal court.67 One notable 
                                                 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.; see also Amy Korte, Illinois Employers Flooded with Class-Action 
Lawsuits Stemming from Biometric Privacy Law, ILL. POL’Y (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-employers-flooded-with-class-action-
lawsuits-stemming-from-biometric-privacy-law/. 
 61 COMP. STAT. 14/10. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Korte, supra note 60 (establishing that Illinois has seen a massive number of 
lawsuits under BIPA since it was passed in 2008). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Complaint, Howe v. Speedway, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-07303 (N.D. Ill. filed 
Oct. 10, 2017); Complaint, Zepeda v. InterContinental Hotels Group, No. 2017-
CH-08904 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed June 27, 2017); see also Korte, supra note 60. 
 66 Korte, supra note 60. 
 67 See Justin Lee, Facebook Facial Recognition Lawsuit Put on Hold, 
BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201702
/facebook-facial-recognition-lawsuit-put-on-hold; see also Facing Privacy Suits 
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federal BIPA case revolves around Facebook’s facial recognition 
software.68 The plaintiffs could file in federal court because they 
were diverse parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.69 The plaintiffs 
in the lawsuit against Facebook claimed that the website’s tag 
suggestion feature violates BIPA by collecting and storing unique 
biometrics identifiers data from their uploaded images without 
providing written notice or gaining consent from their users.70 
The social media giant defended its activity by asserting the 
plaintiffs must prove an injury in fact resulting from the site’s 
misuse of biometric information, not just a technical violation of 
BIPA, to maintain standing.71 An injury in fact must be “an invasion 
of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” 
and cannot be “conjectural or hypothetical.”72 On top of its assertion 
that the plaintiffs do not have standing, Facebook also contends that 
BIPA violates the Commerce Clause73 and that the site’s users 
actually do consent to the usage of facial recognition software when 
they allow themselves to be tagged in online photos.74 
                                                 
About Facial Recognition: BIPA Cases Move Forward as More States Consider 
Passing Biometric Data Laws, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO. SEC. 
BLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/10/04/facing-
privacy-suits-about-facial-recognition-bipa-cases-move-forward-as-more-states-
consider-passing-biometric-data-laws/. 
 68 In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1172 
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff users stated a claim under BIPA). 
 69 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (stating that federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over diversity cases where the parties are citizens of different states 
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000). 
 70 See In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1172. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. 
of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2134 (1992)). 
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(claiming that the BIPA violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
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commerce). 
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B. BIPA Litigation & Standing Requirements 
The federal suit against Facebook has reached the Ninth Circuit, 
but the Court has delayed issuing a ruling, pending the outcome of 
the recently remanded Spokeo case.75 The issue in Spokeo was 
whether a per se violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 
constituted an injury in fact in the context of a federal standing 
inquiry.76 In August 2017, the Ninth Circuit held that a per se 
violation of FCRA was enough to trigger a private cause of action 
under the act even if the plaintiffs did not suffer concrete injuries.77 
The per se violation in Spokeo was the misrepresentation of the 
plaintiff’s employment status, age, and marital status.78 More 
specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated that “intangible harms” can 
constitute an injury in fact when the violation of a federal statute 
presents “a risk of real harm” to a “concrete interest.”79 Essentially, 
the Ninth Circuit’s most recent Spokeo decision determined that per 
se violations of a statute, like misrepresenting a user’s personal 
information, will satisfy the injury in fact component of a standing 
analysis only if there is a risk of actual monetary or physical harm. 
A Ninth Circuit decision on the BIPA lawsuit against Facebook 
is likely to be issued soon since Spokeo has been decided on remand. 
Based on the Ninth Circuit’s more recent holding in Spokeo, the 
plaintiff’s suing Facebook have a strong argument in favor of proper 
standing if they can establish a per se BIPA violation and can also 
prove that the violation could cause “concrete harm.”80 Considering 
that stolen biometric identifiers can be used to access the victim’s 
bank information,81 per se BIPA violations could easily result in 
concrete harms. Since the Ninth Circuit’s newly released Spokeo 
decision concerned a federal rather than state law, the court will 
                                                 
 75 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
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have to decide if the holding will apply to the Facebook case.82 If 
Spokeo is applied to state laws like BIPA, the plaintiffs have a strong 
argument that a per se violation will qualify as an injury in fact. 
Defendants fighting BIPA lawsuits in state court have also 
raised plaintiff’s lack of standing as an argument to dismiss.83 An 
Illinois appellate court addressed the standing issue stemming from 
BIPA in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.84 The plaintiff 
in Rosenbach was a mother who purchased a season pass to Six 
Flags theme park for her minor son.85 Six Flags obtained the son’s 
fingerprint for biometric identification so he could be associated 
with the season pass his mother purchased.86 The plaintiff asserted 
Six Flags did not provide her or her son with written consent forms 
and that she did not consent to the use of a scanner to collect her 
son’s fingerprints when he obtained the pass.87 She did not claim that 
any physical or monetary harm resulted from the fingerprint 
scanning, but she did identify per se violations of BIPA, which 
prompted Six Flags to question whether the plaintiff was an 
“aggrieved” party under BIPA.88 Rosenbach argued that a privacy 
violation codified by BIPA is enough of an injury to warrant 
punishment under the act.89 The statute does not define aggrieved, 
so the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois construed the term 
to mean some “adverse effect or harm resulting from the 
violation.”90 
                                                 
 82 Robins v, Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d at 1113. 
 83 See Paul Tassin, Six Flags Biometric Privacy Class Action Must Allege 
Actual Harm, Says Court, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Dec. 27, 2017), 
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 84 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 Ill. App. 160317; see Tassin, 
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 85 Rosenbach, 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160317 at ¶ 7–10; see Tassin, supra note 83. 
 86 Rosenbach at ¶ 7–10. 
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 89 See Tassin, supra note 83. 
 90 Rosenbach, 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160317 at ¶ 20. 
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The Illinois appellate court’s interpretation means that state 
lawsuits under BIPA will require more than a technical violation, 
such as not notifying consumers of the finger scanning process.91 
Based on the holding in Rosenbach, citizens interested in filing a 
BIPA lawsuit in state court will likely have to prove that a violation 
caused them to experience tangible, concrete harm. Rosenbach’s 
holding conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s recent Spokeo decision 
because it bars plaintiffs filing in state court from establishing an 
injury in fact based on the possibility of tangible harm, while Spokeo 
would allow this in federal court.92 This tension forces plaintiffs to 
either establish tangible harm, such as a compromised bank account, 
or attempt to file a diversity action in federal court.93 BIPA is a step 
forward in protecting the biometric information of Illinois’s citizens, 
but standing conflicts could chill private suits seeking to enforce the 
act. 
C. Texas & Washington’s Biometric Privacy Laws 
Texas passed the nation’s second commercial biometric privacy 
law, the Texas Biometric Privacy Act (BPA), in 2009.94 Like the 
Illinois BIPA, the Texas BPA aims to restrict and regulate the 
commercial collection, retention, and disclosure of biometric 
identifiers.95 However, the BPA does not offer Texans a private right 
of action, leaving the attorney general as the law’s only enforcer.96 
In the Texas statute, “biometric identifiers” are defined as “retina or 
iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprint, or the recording of hand or face 
geometry.”97 The definition of biometric identifiers in the Texas 
                                                 
 91 See Tassin, supra note 83. 
 92 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 
S.Ct. 931. 
 93 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 94 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2009); Annemaria Duran, 
Understanding the Texas Biometric Privacy Law as an Employer, SWIPECLOCK 
WORKFORCE MGMT. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www3.swipeclock.com
/understanding-texas-biometric-privacy-law-employer/. 
 95 BUS. & COM. § 503.001. 
 96 Id.; see Tumeh, supra note 27 (explaining Texas wanted a more business-
friendly biometrics law so they could strike a better balance between privacy and 
corporate interests than Illinois). 
 97 BUS. & COM. § 503.001. 
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statute closely mirrors that of the Illinois statute. Unlike Illinois, the 
Texas BPA only requires notice, not written consent, for the 
collection of biometric identifiers.98 Both statutes require the 
destruction of stored biometric identifiers once certain requirements 
are met.99 Yet another difference between the Illinois law and the 
Texas law is that the former completely bans the sale and leasing of 
commercially obtained biometric identifiers while the latter allows 
for sale and leasing if a narrow set of conditions are met.100 In Texas, 
businesses can sell or lease biometric information acquired from 
customers or employees if the information is necessary to complete 
a financial transaction expressly authorized by the individual that 
provided the data.101 
While the Illinois BIPA and the Texas BPA both restrict the 
commercial collection, storage, and disclosure of biometric 
information, the lack of a written consent requirement, the inability 
for citizens to file suits, and the ability to sell or lease biometrics 
make Texas’s law more favorable to businesses than Illinois’s.102 
Allowing businesses to disclose biometric identifiers for a specific 
purpose, like the completion of a transaction on behalf of the client 
who submitted the information, is a reasonable concession to 
businesses.103 In contrast, excluding a private right of action for 
citizen enforcement and requiring notice, not consent, for the 
collection of biometric identifiers means the law does not go far 
enough to protect consumer privacy.104 State legislatures need to 
balance competing privacy and business interests when drafting 
biometric privacy statutes; instead, Texas’s legislature drafted an 
imbalanced law that favors businesses.105 
                                                 
 98 Id.; Tumeh, supra note 27. 
 99 See Tumeh, supra note 27 (noting that the Illinois law requires destruction 
after the purpose of the information has been satisfied or three years after the 
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 102 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008); BUS. & COM. § 503.001. 
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Washington’s new biometric privacy act is more similar to 
Texas’s somewhat lenient BPA than to Illinois’s strict BIPA. The 
Washington Act is favorable to businesses, but it still differs from 
its counterparts in a number of ways.106 First, the law’s definition of 
“biometric identifiers” includes data or measurements from irises, 
fingerprints, retinas, voices, and “other unique biological 
characteristics or patterns,” but it does not list facial geometry.107 In 
comparison, both Texas and Illinois include facial geometry in their 
definitions of “biometric identifiers.”108 Second, the language of the 
Washington statute forbids a person from “enroll[ing] a biometric 
identifier for a commercial purpose without first providing notice, 
obtaining consent or providing a mechanism to prevent the 
subsequent use of a biometric identifier for a commercial 
purpose.”109 “Person” means an “individual, partnership, 
corporation, limited liability company, organization, association, or 
any other legal or commercial entity” as defined by the statute.110 
Additionally, “enroll” means “to capture a biometric identifier of an 
individual, convert it into a reference template that cannot be 
reconstructed into the original output image, and store it in a 
database that matches the biometric identifier to a specific 
individual.”111 The Washington BPA does not define “mechanism,” 
and no cases have been filed requiring the term to be interpreted 
leaving businesses with no guidelines to follow when implementing 
a biometric privacy program.112 
Washington’s law differs from Illinois’s and Texas’s in not only 
its language but also in offering businesses more methods of 
complying with the law.113 Other characteristics of the Washington 
                                                 
 106 COMP. STAT. 14/20; BUS. & COM. § 503.001; H.B. 1493, 65th Leg. Reg., 
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law that mirror the Texas law are the absence of a private right of 
action and the ability of businesses to sell, lease, and disclose 
biometric information under certain circumstances.114 In fact, the 
Washington law is less restrictive of disclosure than the Texas law 
because the former carves out more exceptions that allow businesses 
to share biometric identifiers with other businesses.115 Privacy 
advocates argue that although the Washington law and the Texas 
BPA improve biometric security, they both “lack teeth” because 
citizens cannot enforce either one by bringing suits for violations.116 
Without a private right of action, government attorneys decide when 
to punish businesses for biometric privacy violations.117 Since the 
attorneys enforcing the Washington statute and the Texas BPA will 
have discretion over what cases to pursue, citizens with valid claims 
may be ignored.118 Since citizens do not have a private right of action 
under the Texas and Washington laws, neither state has experienced 
the flood of biometric privacy litigation that Illinois has.119  
D. Why Haven’t More States Passed Commercial Biometric 
Privacy Laws? 
As of January of 2018, Illinois, Washington, and Texas are still 
the only three states that have enacted commercial biometric privacy 
laws.120 Three interconnected concerns are holding back other states 
from passing similar laws: the potential for class-action lawsuits, the 
exact wording of state biometric laws, and individual state interests 
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in business development.121 Despite its enactment in 2008, the 
Illinois BIPA has only recently become the centerpiece of numerous 
lawsuits against major tech companies including Facebook,122 
Google,123 and Shutterfly.124 Legislators in other states likely do not 
want to open the floodgates to a wave of class-action lawsuits by 
passing a biometric privacy law too similar to the Illinois BIPA.125 
In response to the barrage of BIPA lawsuits in Illinois, others states 
“may either reconsider the scope of their proposed biometric data 
privacy laws or the wisdom of even enacting such laws.”126 
If other states are committed to passing their own commercial 
biometric privacy laws, they will have to decide how broad such a 
law should be. The Illinois BIPA was once seen as a “possible 
model” for similar laws, but class-action lawsuits and aggressive 
lobbying from companies interested in collecting biometric 
information, such as Facebook and Google, have scared states away 
from strict limits on the usage of biometric information and the 
inclusion of a private right of action.127 Without a viable model over 
which technology companies and privacy advocates can 
compromise, state legislatures have struggled to pass new biometric 
privacy laws.128 Seven states have laws currently pending, but cannot 
get the votes to finally pass them.129 Legislators in New York 
struggled to even complete a proposal because of debate over how 
to define “biometrics.”130 The Washington biometric privacy act, 
which does not yet have an official title and was passed just last year, 
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is one of the “best example[s] of industry pushback on attempts to 
regulate biometric data” because of its business-friendly biometric 
collection requirements and its lack of a citizen suit provision.131 One 
of the bill’s co-sponsors, Washington Representative Mark 
Harmsworth, revealed that if the bill included a private right of 
action, he was unsure it would have passed.132 Consumer rights 
organizations arguing for strict biometric privacy laws and tech 
giants lobbying for business-friendly provisions, or even against the 
passage of such laws as a whole, has made drafting, much less 
passing, biometric privacy laws almost impossible. 
Instead of “reconsidering the scope” of potential biometric 
privacy laws, some states may not even attempt to pass them.133 
Biometric privacy laws may deter businesses from expanding to 
states that have enacted these types of statutes,134 and some states 
may not be willing to sacrifice that growth in exchange for enhanced 
consumer privacy. States considering biometric privacy laws must 
also consider how such a law would affect businesses already in 
operation, particularly corporations that have an interest in utilizing 
their customers’ biometric identifiers. Potential liability under a new 
biometric privacy law could force corporations to stop working on 
innovative projects, or even leave the state entirely.135 Jeff Morris, 
the other co-sponsor of Washington’s biometric privacy act, said 
that balancing privacy rights and technological innovation “was a 
challenge.” A federal biometric privacy law would alleviate the 
pressure on states to balance economic development, innovation, 
and consumer privacy. Simply put, zealous lobbying on behalf of 
technology companies, lack of a model statute that privacy and 
technology proponents can agree on, and fear of opening the door to 
more class-action lawsuits have stopped other states from 
successfully passing biometrics privacy laws. 
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E. A Survey of American Privacy Law 
Passing a federal law can be an arduous process.136 Until a 
federal law focused solely on biometric privacy is passed, the states, 
and to a lesser extent, existing federal laws, will bear the primary 
burden of protecting citizens’ biometric information.137 To avoid a 
drawn-out federal legislative process that still may not produce a 
law, Congress may be able to add biometric privacy provisions, like 
the ones already in the HIPAA and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA).138 After all, the United States has been fighting to protect 
the privacy of its citizens since its humble beginnings.139 Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis Brandeis catapulted privacy law into mainstream 
prominence when the Harvard Law Review published their article 
The Right to Privacy in 1890.140 Warren and Brandeis’ article 
discusses an inherent right to privacy, the interplay between that 
right, tort law, and intellectual property law, and both authors’ 
perceived limits on the right.141 The Right to Privacy garnered 
widespread attention142 and paved the way for the privacy revolution 
that took place after the turn of the century.143 
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At the beginning of the 1900s, existing laws in the United States 
were insufficient to handle the growing privacy concerns stemming 
from evolving technology and citizens started filing “privacy tort” 
lawsuits to protect their rights.144 In response to growing concerns 
about wiretapping and the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in 
Olmstead v. United States,145 the federal government began to pass 
privacy laws to protect its citizens starting with the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934.146 The remainder of the 20th century 
saw the narrowing of the Fourth Amendment, although during that 
same time period Congress passed numerous federal privacy laws to 
protect Americans against government and corporate intrusion.147 
One of the privacy laws, and the first health privacy law, passed 
during the 20th century was HIPAA.148 
HIPAA was passed in 1996 as a part of a congressional push for 
healthcare reform in response to growing national concern over the 
privacy of confidential information disclosed to healthcare 
providers and insurance companies.149 Amongst other mandates that 
are not relevant to this Recent Development, HIPAA ensures that 
personal information Americans provide to healthcare providers 
remains confidential.150 Furthermore, HIPAA “mandates uniform 
standards for electronic data transmission of administrative and 
financial data relating to patient health information.”151 Violations of 
HIPAA can be costly; multiple violations in a single calendar year 
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will result in fines in excess of $1,000,000.152 HIPAA was installed 
after the public pushed for healthcare reform, but HIPAA only 
protects biometric privacy in one industry. Further, citizens alleging 
HIPAA violations actually have no private federal right of action; 
they can only file complaints to be investigated by the Department 
of Justice or a state Attorney General’s office.153 If the Department 
Justice or an Attorney General decides that a HIPAA claim has 
merit, a case will be filed.154 The lack of a citizen suit provision may 
mean that legitimate claims could get ignored by the Department of 
Justice or an Attorney General’s office if they decide a case is not 
worth filing. Certain existing federal laws include biometric privacy 
provisions, but these laws are insufficient because they do not 
provide uniform protection for all Americans against all 
industries.155 
F. Which Existing Federal Laws Address Biometric Privacy? 
HIPAA is just one example of the many federal privacy laws 
promulgated by Congress during the 20th century.156 Federal law 
takes a “sectoral approach” to privacy, meaning that “the primary 
source of privacy laws in the United States takes the form of various 
laws governing industry sectors.”157 HIPAA, GLBA, and the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) all have provisions 
that include biometric privacy.158 HIPAA lists various categories of 
“protected health information” (PHI) that are subject to data transfer 
restrictions. Financial institutions must comply with the GLBA 
which mandates the protection of “non-public personal 
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information.”159 Although biometric identifiers are not explicitly 
mentioned in GLBA, non-public personal information is read 
broadly to include things that would be considered biometric 
identifiers.160 Unfortunately, the GLBA allows for the sale of non-
public information and is silent on consent for the acquisition of that 
same information, giving rise to the question of whether or not the 
law actually safeguards biometric privacy.161 This question is further 
complicated by the dual status of biometric information, discussed 
in Part I. Although biometric identifiers are unique to individuals, 
making them private, the whole world can see, and possibly 
duplicate, those identifiers, making them public as well. For GLBA 
to apply to biometric information, lawyers will need to navigate this 
odd dichotomy. Lastly, educational institutions are explicitly 
restricted from disclosing student biometric information without 
parental consent under FERPA.162 Some exceptions to FERPA 
apply, but its provisions provide far more robust safeguards than the 
GLBA.163 
G. Which Existing State Laws Address Biometric Privacy? 
Many states that have not passed or introduced a biometric 
privacy bill have addressed the topic in existing laws.164 For 
example, North Carolina used an existing law, the Identity Theft 
Protection Act, to protect biometric privacy because it included 
“biometric data” as a form of identifying information.165 The North 
Carolina law “requires any entity conducting business in the state 
and maintaining personal information of a resident to take 
reasonable measures to protect the information against unauthorized 
access.”166 Many other states also have data breach laws that protect 
biometric information, including South Carolina.167 The South 
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Carolina law includes “information issued by a governmental or 
regulatory entity that will uniquely identify an individual” in its 
definition of “personal identifying information.”168 This broad 
definition could be construed to include information like 
fingerprints or retina data, but since it does not explicitly list 
biometric information within its definition of “personal identifying 
information,” protection is not guaranteed. 
H. Why State Laws and Existing Federal Laws Do Not Adequately 
Protect Biometric Privacy 
Existing state and federal laws do not adequately protect 
biometric privacy in the United States. The sectoral approach to 
privacy regulation is simultaneously too restrictive and not 
restrictive enough.169 Many federal privacy laws overlap with one 
another because many businesses walk a thin line between one or 
more sectors leading to excess regulation.170 The unfortunate 
businesses subject to multiple privacy laws struggle to comply with 
the seemingly endless number of uncertain, inconsistent 
provisions.171 On the opposite end of the privacy regulation spectrum 
sit businesses and organizations that fall into the many gaps created 
by dividing our economy into sectors. Passing a federal biometric 
privacy law would set uniform standards for commercial 
organizations across the country, and even though the standards may 
require some interpretation, it would eliminate sectoral gaps. The 
argument against letting the states serve as the primary defenders of 
biometric privacy is far less complex: state laws only extend so far. 
A federal law will provide protection for the biometric information 
of every American and states will not need to pass their own laws or 
scramble to adapt existing laws to the new concerns surrounding 
biometrics. 
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IV. WHAT SHOULD A FEDERAL BIOMETRIC PRIVACY LAW LOOK 
LIKE? 
Despite the array of federal privacy laws that Congress has 
signed into law, no reports had surfaced at the time of this Recent 
Development identifying legislation that addresses commercial 
biometric privacy. If legislation is introduced, Congress will have to 
decide how to define the term “biometric identifier,” what limits to 
set on the collection and storage of biometric information, whether 
or not businesses should be able to sell, or disclose that same 
information, and finally whether or not to include a private right of 
action.172 Making decisions on the exact wording of a federal 
biometrics law will be complicated by the immense lobbying power 
large technology companies wield.173 Corporate lobbying efforts 
resulted in the watered-down biometric privacy law that Washington 
passed and have even stopped other states from passing similar laws 
entirely.174 If Congress decides to introduce a biometric privacy bill, 
it must properly balance consumer rights and business development 
in a way that makes the bill politically viable. 
A. How a Federal Law Should Define “Biometric Identifiers” 
Congress could use a definition similar to those contained in 
Texas and Illinois statutes, or they could use a less detailed, but 
potentially broader, definition like Washington’s.175 Alternatively, 
Congress could use the Biometric Research Group’s expansive 
definition of biometrics, which includes both physical and 
behavioral characteristics.176 To be as inclusive as possible, 
Congress could even use the Biometric Research Group’s definition 
and then add a non-exhaustive list of biometric identifiers for 
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clarity.177 A federal biometric privacy law should be expansive and 
forward-thinking, meaning that Congress should embrace the 
Biometric Research Group’s definition and formulate their own 
non-exhaustive list of identifiers. This would expand the law to 
cover not only physical characteristics but also behavioral 
characteristics.178 Adding a non-exhaustive list of biometric 
identifiers to the definition of biometrics would make the law 
adaptable enough to sufficiently cover both existing, and future, 
applications of biometric identification technology. Litigation 
deciding whether certain characteristics should be considered a 
biometric identifier is inevitable, so Congress should list as many 
identifiers as they can to at least reduce the number of lawsuits. The 
constantly evolving field of biometrics precludes Congress from 
developing a complete list of biometric identifiers, but that should 
not stop them from drafting the most inclusive definition possible. 
While predicting future applications of biometric technology is 
difficult, a clause preceding the non-exhaustive list of identifiers that 
clearly states the list is subject to expansion is necessary. 
B. How a Federal Law Should Address the Collection and Storage 
of Biometric Information 
First and foremost, Congress must decide if a federal law should 
require notice and consent for the collection of biometric 
information, like Illinois, or just notice, like Texas and 
Washington.179 To make the federal law’s collection section even 
more robust, Congress could even require a unique document for 
biometric collection completely separate from any user agreements 
or other corporate documents. By creating a unique consent form for 
the collection of biometric information, citizens would be less likely 
to blindly sign away their biometric identifiers as part of a massive 
user agreement. Including notice and consent requirements would 
hold commercial entities to a higher standard and is thus the 
preferable approach for Congress to take. 
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After determining how to restrict the collection of biometric 
information, Congress will then need to lay out requirements for the 
safe storage and timely destruction of biometric records. The least 
restrictive storage requirement Congress could mandate is one that 
allows commercial entities to maintain biometric records for “a 
reasonable time.”180 Washington’s biometric privacy uses this broad 
storage provision, and because the law is so new, the outer limits of 
the standard have not been established.181 Washington also 
supplements its “reasonable time” storage mandate with three 
exceptions that allow businesses to store the information longer.182 
Texas and Illinois included similar “reasonable time” requirements 
and added time limits on storage as well.183 To strike the proper 
balance between privacy rights and business interests, Congress 
should model federal storage and destruction provisions after the 
ones employed by Texas and Illinois. A maximum storage period 
set three years, or less, from the collection of the information could 
be combined with carveouts for businesses that have exceptional 
reasons to maintain biometric records for longer and a “reasonable 
time” standard to produce the best storage and mandatory 
destruction provision possible. 
C. Proposed Characteristics of a Provision on the Sale and 
Disclosure of Biometric Information 
The third significant consideration Congress will need to address 
is the sale and disclosure of biometric information.184 Illinois 
completely banned the sale of biometric information but allows for 
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disclosure if required by another law.185 BIPA also allows disclosure 
if a company is faced with a subpoena, warrant, or if disclosure is 
“necessary to complete a financial transaction.”186 For disclosure to 
be authorized under any scenario, BIPA requires consent from the 
individual that provided the biometric information.187 Washington 
and Texas let commercial entities sell and disclose biometric 
information if certain exceptions apply.188 Texas’s list of exceptions 
for disclosure is the same as Illinois’s list, and the former applies 
those same exceptions to the sale of biometric information.189 
Washington’s list of exceptions for the sale and disclosure of 
biometric information includes the ones listed by Texas and Illinois 
in addition to four more exceptions.190 To strike a balance between 
corporate interests and biometric privacy, Congress should adopt the 
Texas approach. Giving businesses the right to sell and disclose 
biometric information in a small number of circumstances will 
protect privacy interests and will not stifle a business’s ability to 
operate. 
D. Should a Federal Law Include a Private Right of Action? 
Absolutely. 
The final major decision that Congress will need to make is 
whether to include a private right of action such as the one in 
Illinois’s BIPA.191 Adding a private right of action will give the law 
the “teeth” that detractors of Texas and Washington’s laws are 
clamoring for, but it could also raise a number of legal questions and 
lead to a flood of new lawsuits.192 Meticulous drafting will not save 
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an extremely innovative federal law governing biometric privacy 
law from lawsuits hinging on statutory interpretation. That being 
said, clearly defining relevant terms and producing a comprehensive 
law will minimize litigation. Moreover, a private right of action will 
give consumers and employees the power to protect their rights 
without relying on an Attorney General’s office. Other laws, like 
HIPAA, have only proven that submitting claims to a government 
office for review will not always provide the same level of 
protection as a citizen suit provision.193 Government attorneys have 
limited time and resources to investigate claims so every violation 
submitted will not be given equal consideration. Compromised 
biometric databases could ruin the lives of countless Americans, and 
cases involving delicate biometric information should not be 
selectively pursued based on the discretion of a small group of 
attorneys. An increase in litigation stemming from a citizen suit 
provision is a small price to pay for more robust protection of 
American biometric information. Congress needs to balance privacy 
and business interests to make sure a federal biometric privacy law 
is politically viable, but they cannot fold under pressure from the 
tech sector and exclude a private right of action from the statute. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The explosion of interest in biometrics across the United States 
over the last few years has raised serious concerns about the safety 
of biometric technology and what businesses do with biometric 
information. The utility of biometrics is obvious and continually 
expanding, but the improper taking or disclosing of such 
information can irreparably harm innocent employees or consumers. 
Some states have taken the initiative and passed laws solely 
dedicated to the protection of biometric information used in 
commercial settings. Other states and the federal government have 
worked biometric privacy safeguards into existing laws or have 
interpreted existing laws to cover biometric privacy. However, 
many states have not directly addressed commercial biometric 
privacy, and even the existing safeguards offer varying levels of 
incomplete protection. 
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A federal law would offer uniform protection across the country, 
though the level of protection would depend on a myriad of factors 
including corporate lobbying, privacy lobbying, and state 
ideological differences. Regardless of the political hurdles on the 
track to ratification, Congress should aim for a biometric privacy 
law that is expansive and provides a private right of action so 
citizens do not have to rely on government actors for protection. A 
private right of action may lead to more litigation and disputes over 
legal technicalities, but those minor consequences are preferable to 
promulgating a feeble law that forces citizens to hope the attorney 
general decides to act when a complaint is made. When enforcement 
is handled solely by an attorney general’s office, many cases will 
never be filed because of discretionary decisions and information 
gathering deficiencies.194 Biometric information is invaluable to its 
owner, and the level of protection it is afforded should reflect that. 
Congress must take note of the how much inherent value biometric 
information holds and enact a federal law that fills current legislative 
gaps and safeguards the biometric data of American employees and 
consumers. 
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